Trying to explain things to complete dumbfucks…

This might help the clueless. Of course, the clueless can’t think. I am not sure why I am providing this because the person in question is as thick as pigshit.

In fact, the person in question shovels pigshit (or some other animal’s shit) for a living. Anyway.

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)

1972, that means that the “collective right interpretation” of the Second Amendment existed prior to 1974, which thick as pigshit refuses to concede. Not that his opinions are worth much anyway. After all, this is is a fat, ignorant fuck who is proud to be a fat, ignorant fuck. He doesn’t see the inconsistencies in supporting “the Second Amendment, The Military, and Ted Nugent” is “pro-gun” while being “pro-life” and believes that global warming is a hoax.

verbum sapientum

Anyway, the facts of the case:

Acting on a tip supplied moments earlier by an informant known to him, a police officer asked respondent to open his car door. Respondent lowered the window, and the officer reached into the car and found a loaded handgun (which had not been visible from the outside) in respondent’s waistband, precisely where the informant said it would be. Respondent was arrested for unlawful possession of the handgun. A search incident to the arrest disclosed heroin on respondent’s person (as the informant had reported), as well as other contraband in the car. Respondent’s petition for federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence that had been used in the trial resulting in respondent’s conviction had been obtained by an unlawful search.

Fourth Amendment search and seizure relating to a handgun

Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S 143, 150 -51 (1972)

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs, dissenting.

My views have been stated in substance by Judge Friendly, dissenting, in the Court of Appeals. 436 F.2d 30, 35. Connecticut allows its citizens to carry weapons, concealed or otherwise, at will, provided they have a permit. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 29-35, 29-38. Connecticut law gives its police no authority to frisk a person for a permit. Yet the arrest was for illegal possession of a gun. The only basis for that arrest was the informer’s tip on the narcotics. Can it be said that a man in possession of narcotics will not have a permit for his gun? Is that why the arrest for possession of a gun in the free-and-easy State of Connecticut becomes constitutional?

The police problem is an acute one not because of the Fourth Amendment, but because of the ease with which anyone can acquire a pistol. A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun purchases are constitutional rights protected by the Second Amendment, which reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no reason why a State may not require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to everyone except the police.

The leading case is United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, upholding a federal law making criminal the shipment in interstate commerce of a sawed-off shotgun. The law was upheld, there being no evidence that a sawed-off shotgun had “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.” Id., at 178. The Second Amendment, it was held, “must be interpreted and applied” with the view of maintaining a “militia.”

“The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia – civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” Id., at 178-179.

Critics say that proposals like this water down the Second Amendment. Our decisions belie that argument, for the Second Amendment, as noted, was designed to keep alive the militia. But if watering-down is the mood of the day, I would prefer to water down the Second rather than the Fourth Amendment. I share with Judge Friendly a concern that the easy extension of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, to “possessory offenses” is a serious intrusion on Fourth Amendment safeguards.

“If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows `that criminal activity may be afoot.'” 436 F.2d, at 39, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 30.

Quick trivia question: What special characteristic about Justice Douglas might make him qualified to have special knowledge of the US v Miller decision?

You should know this if you’ve actually read US v Miller.

You have read US v Miller, haven’t you?

Anyway, as I like to point out Justice Stevens’ dissents in Heller and McDonald both keep the “collective right” alive, which David T. Hardy points out in the beginning of his Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent article (2010 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 61):

District of Columbia v. Heller established that the Second Amendment’s right to arms existed as an individual right, with no requirement that the rights-holder be functioning as part of a well-regulated militia. While the majority opinion has been subjected to extensive review and commentary, the Steven dissent, joined by four members of the Court, has not. The dissent came within one vote of becoming the majority; it clearly merits close examination.

Had the dissent become law, the Court would have informed the American people, 70% of whom believed they had an individual right to arms, that their rights-consciousness was sadly mistaken.

I strongly disagree that Stevens’ dissents were based upon “based upon surprisingly thin reasoning and evidence.” If anything, Hardy demonstrates his ignorance of history, which I can bury him in proof. In fact, I am sure Hardy will use the usual half-quotations and misinterpretations that when read in their fullness show he is making a false assertion.

I’ll toss in this language from U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1942) as proof that the “Collective right” interpretation was around well before 1974.

It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of this amendment contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption and those of learned writers since [footnote 13] that this amendment, unlike those providing for protection of free speech and freedom of religion, was not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations against possible encroachments by the federal power. [footnote 14] The experiences in England under James II of an armed royal force quartered upon a defenseless citizenry [footnote 15] was fresh in the minds of the Colonists. They wanted no repetition of that experience in their newly formed government. The almost uniform course of decision in this country, [footnote 16] where provisions similar in language are found in many of the State Constitutions bears out this concept of the constitutional guarantee. A notable instance is the refusal to extend its application to weapons thought incapable of military use.

The contention of the appellant in this case could, we think, be denied without more under the authority of United States v. Miller, 1939, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206. This was a prosecution under the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the weapon, the possession of which had occasioned the prosecution of the accused, was a shotgun of less than 18 inch barrel. The Court said that in the absence of evidence tending to show that possession of such a gun at the time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, it could not be said that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep such an instrument. The appellant here having failed to show such a relationship, the same thing may be said as applied to the pistol found in his possession. It is not material on this point that the 1934 statute was bottomed on the taxing power while the statute in question here was based on a regulation of interstate commerce.

But, further, the same result is definitely indicated on a broader ground and on this we should prefer to rest the matter. Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law. It was regulated by statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since. [footnote 17] The decisions under the State Constitutions show the upholding of regulations prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, prohibiting persons from going armed in certain public places and other restrictions, in the nature of police regulations, but which do not go so far as substantially to interfere with the public interest protected by the constitutional mandates. [footnote 18] The Federal statute here involved is one of that general type. One could hardly argue seriously that a limitation upon the privilege of possessing weapons was unconstitutional when applied to a mental patient of the maniac type. The same would be true if the possessor were a child of immature years. In the situation at bar Congress has prohibited the receipt of weapons from interstate transactions by persons who have previously, by due process of law, been shown to be aggressors against society. [footnote 19] Such a classification is entirely reasonable and does not infringe upon the preservation of the well regulated militia protected by the Second Amendment.

Of course, the only people who really care about this issue are the “gun rights” crowd.

On the other hand, had Stevens’ opinions been majority opinions, there would have been a lot of explaining. The people doing the explaining would be the liars who have been fobbing off this bogus “individual right” interpretation of the Second Amendment. Unfortunately, it doens’t take too much to play on the historic ignorance of the American public which takes myth for reality.

Fact is, the Heller-McDonald decisions created an “individual right” where one didn’t exist (please show me the language in the Second Amendment if it does) which is subject to strong regulation:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Heller at 54-5

Which has as a footnote (26):

We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.

Better yet:

But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home. Heller at 64

From McDonald:

It is important to keep in mind that Heller, while striking down a law that prohibited the possession of handguns in the home, recognized that the right to keep and bear arms is not “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 54). We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 54–55). We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms. McDonald at 39-40

Eventually, the word will get out: the Second Amendment right applies to the rights relating to well-regulated militias and the federal government’s powers under Article I, Section 8, clause 16:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

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